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Abstract 
 We analyze and review how research on emotion and emotional phenomena can 
elaborate and improve contemporary social exchange theory. After identifying six approaches 
from the psychology and sociology of emotion, we illustrate how these ideas bear on the context, 
process, and outcome of exchange in networks and groups. The paper reviews the current state of 
the field, develops testable hypotheses for empirical study, and provides specific suggestions for 
developing links between theories of emotion and theories of exchange. 
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Introduction 
 Social exchange theory assumes self-interested actors who transact with other self-
interested actors to accomplish individual goals that they cannot achieve alone. Self-interest and 
interdependence are central properties of social exchange. Whether it is two lovers who share a 
warm and mutual affection, or two corporations who pool resources to generate a new product, 
the basic form of interaction remains the same. Two or more actors, each of whom has 
something of value to the other, decide whether to exchange and in what amounts. Such actors 
are normally viewed as unemotional beings who have information, cognitively process it, and 
make decisions concerning the pattern and nature of exchange with others. In this paper we 
explore how emotions can be brought into social exchange theory. 
 Within the exchange tradition, emotions are a relatively vacuous “catchall” category for 
phenomena that cannot be subsumed by behavioral or rational choice principles. The classic 
works on exchange contain references to emotion of various sorts (Thibaut & Kelley 1959, 
Homans 1961, Blau 1964) and even sustained concern with some emotionally tinged 
phenomena, such as “sentiment” in Homans (1961). In the related literature on justice and 
equity, emotional reactions are assumed to be more important, but even there, they are not 
theorized to any great extent (Molm & Cook 1995, Hegtvedt & Markovsky 1995). This is true of 
most sociological theories and traditions; in fact, it is only in the last 10 to 15 years that emotions 
became a prominent research area in the discipline (Kemper 1990a,b, Gordon 1981, Scheff 1983, 
Thoits 1989).  
 A close examination of many common exchange relations suggests that emotions both 
enter and pervade social exchange processes. Friendship relations are often propelled by strong 
affection or feelings of joy; corporate mergers may result from fear or anger; economic 
BRINGING EMOTIONS 4 
   
   
 
partnerships may thrive because they produce positive feelings such as confidence or pleasure. 
The context of exchange may have a discernible emotional tone, invoke particular emotion rules, 
and generate corrective measures when emotions surface or are expressed (Hochschild 1979). 
The processes of exchange may cause individuals to feel good, satisfied, relieved, excited, and so 
forth (Lawler & Yoon 1996). The outcome of social exchange may generate pride or shame 
directed at one’s self (Scheff 1990a) or anger or gratitude directed toward the other (Weiner 
1986). We believe that emotional dynamics have a more central role in social exchange than 
typically assumed. This is the motivation for writing this paper.  
 Emotion is neglected primarily because of metatheoretical conceptions at the core of 
exchange theory, in particular, behavioral and rational choice assumptions about actors. From a 
behavioral (reinforcement) perspective, emotions are essentially epiphenomenal, that is, 
inseparable from reinforcements and punishments (Homans 1961, Emerson 1972a,b). As 
rational-choice principles were introduced into exchange theorizing, it became increasingly clear 
that actors who engage in “cognitive work” may not strictly conform to either rational choice or 
reinforcement principles. One reason is judgmental biases (see Molm 1994, Plous 1993). 
Exchange theorists have been willing to incorporate the idea of an information-processing, 
cognizing actor but slow to introduce the idea of an emoting actor. There are, however, 
exceptions. Several recent papers examine the role of emotion in exchange (see Lovaglia 1995, 
Molm & Cook 1995, Willer et al 1997), and interest among rational choice theorists is revealed 
by a 1993 special issue of Rationality and Society on emotion and choice.  
 To fill the void, we offer a selective review and analysis of the juxtaposition between 
emotion theories and exchange theories. The purpose is to identify avenues by which emotions 
and emotional processes can enrich or improve exchange theorizing and research. We pose 
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questions that warrant attention, provide answers using work from both emotion and exchange 
traditions, and apply select theories of emotion to social exchange phenomena. In general terms 
we are concerned with restricted exchange, broadly defined as a direct exchange involving 
contingencies between actors’ behaviors (Ekeh 1974). Emerson (1981) identified two kinds of 
restricted exchange—reciprocal and negotiated. Reciprocal exchange entails sequential giving 
with unspecified terms and obligations; negotiated exchange entails an agreement with specified 
terms and obligations. In each case, exchange is a joint task and actors have an incentive to 
accomplish or consummate it in some fashion. 
 The organization of this paper is based on three main points of entry for emotion 
phenomena into social exchange—exchange context, exchange process, and exchange outcomes. 
Emotions are part of and can alter the context of exchange as well as be caused and produced by 
the exchange process and/or the results of negotiated exchanges. Before turning to our primary 
task, however, it is important to review recent efforts in sociology and psychology to develop the 
concept and measurement of emotion. 
Conceptualizing Emotions 
 Broadly, we define an emotion as a relatively short-lived positive or negative evaluative 
state that has neurological and cognitive elements (Schachter & Singer 1962, Izard 1991). 
Emotions are internal states that are not under the complete control of actors. We agree that the 
question is, what people do with them? There are many unanswered questions about the nature 
and definition of emotions. How many emotions are there (Kemper 1987)? Are some emotions 
more fundamental and others more derivative (Watson & Tellegen 1985, Izard 1991, Kemper 
1987, Scheff 1990b)? Are emotions culturally specific or universal (Lutz 1988, Izard 1971, 
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Scherer 1984, 1988)? Our purpose is not to address all or even many of these issues directly, but 
to help social-exchange researchers cut a path through such sticky conceptual issues.  
 Over the last ten or so years, psychologists have attempted to develop concepts and 
measures of emotion based on the words people use to describe their own feelings and those of 
others. This approach, which might be termed psychometric, has addressed two conceptual 
issues: first, whether there are a small number of dimensions (two or three) that can concisely 
capture fundamental emotions beneath the apparent diversity of feeling-words used by people 
themselves; second, whether some emotions are categorically different than others.1  
 These questions have inspired two competing models. One indicates that emotions lie on 
continua, that is, they vary as a matter of degree over a few fundamental dimensions (Guttman 
1954, Russell 1980, Watson & Tellegen 1985, Russell et al 1989, Mano 1991). Perhaps the best-
known solution here is Russell’s (1980) circumplex model of affect, which maps the universe of 
emotion as points on a circle in two-dimensional bipolar space. One dimension of the circumplex 
captures emotional valence (pleasure-displeasure); the other dimension is oriented perpendicular 
to the first and reflects the level of arousal (high-low). Although some debate has arisen over 
how the dimensions should be named (Larsen & Diener 1992), and how many dimensions are 
optimal (Osgood 1966, Russell & Mehrabian 1977), there is considerable evidence that many 
people do organize their emotions in this way (Russell 1980, 1983, 1991, Watson & Tellegen 
1985, Watson et al 1984, Russell & Ridgeway 1983, Haslam 1995). 
                                                          
1 There are many debates in this literature, most of which are beyond the scope of our discussion. For example, 
emotions have been construed as (a) continuously graded or sharp categories (Russell 1980, Clore et al 1987), (b) 
infused with cognition or separate systems (Lazarus 1982, 1984, 1995, Zajonc 1980, 1984), (c) culturally specific or 
mostly pancultural (Lutz 1988, Izard 1971, Shaver et al 1992), (d) accompanied by diffuse or specific physiological 
arousal (Schachter & Singer 1962, Levenson et al 1992), and the list goes on. 
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 The second model stipulates that the experience of emotion is not as continuous or 
seamless as the circumplex might suggest (Clore et al 1987, Oatley & Johnson-Laird 1987, 
Ekman 1980, 1992, Izard 1977, Batra & Holbrook 1990, Osgood 1966, Storm & Storm 1987, 
Wierzbicka 1992). These researchers argue that emotions are discrete events, and that the 
circumplex model can be decomposed into a small number of distinct regions that represent 
fundamental emotions, each qualitatively different from the others. The usual suspects for a list 
of fundamental or basic emotions include anger, fear, joy or pleasure, frustration, and sadness; 
such emotions ostensibly differ along an important dimension that the circumplex does not 
capture. For example, Larsen & Diener (1992) point out that anger and fear are very close to one 
another on the circumplex (i.e., both emotions are negative and active) and yet these emotions 
tend to result in very different behaviors. Whereas anger may lead a person to fight, fear might 
cause a person to retreat. Frijda and associates (Frijda 1986, Frijda et al 1989) provide evidence 
that different emotions do in fact activate different levels of action readiness.  
 The above suggests that all emotions vary along a few abstract dimensions, but also that 
each emotion may have a few concrete properties that make it unique from others. We see an 
inherent tradeoff between continuous models that focus on the abstract or general properties of 
emotion, and discrete models that emphasize the more concrete or specific aspects. Neither 
model is necessarily better than the other; the question becomes, what is the theoretical payoff 
for a general versus specific concept of emotion? In the social exchange literature, which is still 
relatively young, we suggest that the circumplex model provides researchers with a good abstract 
account of the emotional universe overall, and it also has the advantage of pointing to 
dimensions that intuitively seem important to social exchange (e.g. pleasure and arousal). The 
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processes and outcomes of exchange can and do generate variable degrees of pleasure and 
arousal in the form of excitement (Lawler & Yoon 1996). 
Approaches to Emotion and Social Exchange 
 What emotion theories or frameworks have implications for exchange contexts, 
processes, or outcomes? There are innumerable frameworks for classifying or grouping the types 
of emotion or emotional processes; in fact, there has been an outpouring of such efforts in the 
last 10 to 15 years. Kemper has contributed a number of important works, including his contrast 
of fundamental emotions that are neurologically wired versus other emotions that are socially 
constructed (Kemper 1978, 1987). Averill (1992:2) developed a comprehensive, multilevel, 15-
category classification of variables that cause emotional behaviors. Izard (1991) revised his 
differentiated-emotions theory, which bears some resemblance to Kemper’s notion of 
fundamental emotions. Ortony and associates (1988) developed a framework that argues for 
three classes of emotion based on the cognitive object involved: events, actions, or objects. 
Sociological researchers such as Hochschild (1979, 1983), Clark (1990), Heise (1979), and 
Collins (1981, 1989) developed conceptual distinctions directed at a particular theoretical 
problem or domain. 
 Based on our analysis of these frameworks we identify six approaches to the study of 
emotion, two for each facet of exchange: context, process, and outcome. In the case of exchange 
context, a cultural-normative approach (Hochschild 1990) treats emotions as part of the 
normative context, while a structural-relational approach (Collins 1975, Kemper 1978) treats 
actors’ social positions as fundamental causes of emotions and feelings. In the case of exchange 
process, a social-cognitive perspective (Isen 1987, Bower 1991) views emotions as shaping 
actors’ perceptions and interpretations of the other and situation, and sensory-informational 
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theories (Heise 1979, Frank 1988) view emotions as important signals (or bits of information) 
that are displayed to actors and others. Finally, for exchange outcomes, a social-attribution 
approach (Weiner 1985, 1986) analyzes the emotions produced by actors’ attributions of 
credit/blame for good/bad outcomes, and the social-formations approach (Collins 1981, Lawler 
& Yoon 1996) indicates how emotional reactions to exchange outcomes impact relations over 
time. Each approach poses a unique set of theoretical questions. We briefly introduce these 
below and explore them more deeply in the sections that follow.  
 To analyze the exchange context, the cultural-normative approach starts from the premise 
that any social context invokes expectations about what sort of emotions are appropriate to 
experience and, in particular, to express in a visible or public manner (Hochschild 1990, Clark 
1990, Thoits 1990). For example, the norms for displaying emotions at a funeral, wedding, or job 
interview are socially defined and circumscribed. Behavior that is consistent with the prevailing 
emotional norms both affirms and reestablishes those norms while fostering an emotional tone, 
i.e., a prevailing emotional environment, that is salient to new entrants. Thus, exchange contexts 
should have norms for displaying emotions in addition to an emotional tone tied to the particular 
exchange context.  
 Taking a different slice of the exchange context, structural/relational approaches begin 
from the premise that social positions impact the emotions people are likely to feel. The core 
idea is captured by Collins’ (1975) theory of social stratification, which essentially claims that 
giving orders makes people feel good while taking orders makes people feel bad. This may be 
due to different capabilities to generate rewards and avoid costs, the degree of respect and social 
esteem they receive from others, and/or the overall sense of control they have in the particular 
social context. Such explanations have stimulated exchange theorists to address a variety of 
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questions linking power, status, and emotion (Kemper 1978, 1987, Kemper & Collins 1990, 
Ridgeway & Johnson 1990, Lovaglia & Houser 1996). 
 To analyze the process of exchange, sensory-informational approaches begin with the 
notion that emotions are signals to self (Heise 1966, 1987) and/or to others (Frank 1988, 1993). 
For example, feeling bad as a result of violating an emotion norm is an internal signal that will 
likely produce restitutive action such as an apology. Issues for exchange theories include the role 
of emotions in signaling information to the actor and determining when such emotions are 
displayed to others.  
 From a social cognitive approach, emotions modify or adjust cognitions central to the 
exchange processes. A general question is how do emotional states influence actors’ perceptions 
of each other, their predictions for future encounters, and the way they deal with uncertainty? For 
example, given that exchange contexts inherently involve uncertainty, emotions that promote 
more optimistic rather than more pessimistic information processing can have important 
consequences for the exchange process and outcomes.  
 To analyze exchange outcomes, a social-attribution approach starts from the notion that 
attributions of credit or blame to self, the other, or the situation are likely to have emotional 
effects on actors. Specific emotions (gratitude, pity, shame, anger, pride, etc) should vary with 
the nature of the consequences (positive-negative) and attribution target (self, other, situation). 
For example, credit to self yields pride while blame to other yields anger (Weiner 1985). It is 
also possible that attributions are directed at social relationships or larger social units as a 
specific component of the situation (Hewstone 1989).  
 This means that as a joint task, social exchange may generate social attributions, which 
have effects on the order, cohesion, and solidarity of relations and groups. The social-formations 
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approach treats emotions as integral to the process through which relationships and groups form 
and remain salient (Collins 1975, Lawler & Yoon 1993, 1996). This idea can be traced to 
Durkheim’s classic notion, abstracted as follows: When people engage in joint activity with 
others, they tend to experience an uplift (elation) which heightens their sense of collective or 
group membership. Joint activity reaffirms and strengthens social solidarity because of the 
shared emotions and feelings it produces. From this perspective it is important to understand how 
and when social exchange produces shared positive feelings and whether those feelings result in 
stronger affective attachments to an exchange relation or network.  
 These six approaches capture key elements of the exchange context, exchange process, 
and exchange outcomes. These elements hang together in a systematic way as shown in Figure 1. 
Within the exchange context, structural-relational conditions are fundamental causes of emotions 
actually felt and emotion norms shape their expression or display. Within the exchange process, 
emotions have signaling functions for self and for others, and they may bias how members 
perceive one another in present and future interaction. Exchange outcomes—such as the 
frequency and nature of exchange—generate another layer of emotions that can 
increase/decrease social cohesion when the emotions are attributed to exchange relations, 
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Exchange Context and Emotions 
Cultural/Normative Approaches 
 From this perspective, emotions are socially constructed, displayed, and managed in the 
context of the various social roles, memberships, identities, or categories that individuals occupy 
(Clark 1990, Gordon 1990). This idea can be traced to the symbolic interactionism of Goffman 
(1959), who theorized that social situations entail scripts for acceptable behavior. A script is a 
recipe or norm for appropriate behavior in a given situation. Emotional reactions often follow 
scripts, but more importantly, emotion norms can be construed as scripts. For example, it is both 
acceptable and expected to experience and display emotion when a musical piece is concluded at 
an orchestra concert. The same expression and display in the middle of the first movement, 
however, is a stern violation in this context. A good deal of the theoretical and empirical work in 
this tradition has focused on situations that elicit a particular emotion but prohibit it from being 
displayed. In this sense, the cultural/normative approach maintains a focus on the interplay 
between social context (e.g., roles and identities) and outcomes (e.g., emotional displays). When 
there is a discrepancy between the emotions we experience and those we may appropriately 
display, individuals experience what Thoits (1985, 1990) calls “emotional deviance” and may 
attempt to regulate their expression through what Hochschild (1983) terms “emotion 
management.” 
 Hochschild (1975, 1979, 1983) observed that emotions and their rules for display occur 
in the context of norms that are implicitly or explicitly attached to a given job. In her book, The 
Managed Heart, Hochschild (1983) documents that flight attendants (a) often experience strong 
emotions as a result of rude travelers, and (b) are trained to inhibit their true feelings. The result 
is that individuals want to express emotions but cannot, and thus they manage their emotions to 
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alleviate the tension. She proposes two basic strategies through which this occurs. Surface acting 
involves changing one’s outward behavior with the hope of altering inner feelings. For example, 
flight attendants who force themselves to smile after being insulted report feeling better. Deep 
acting occurs when individuals attempt to regulate their physiological activity (e.g., “just calm 
down and breathe slowly”) or shift their focus of attention (e.g., “just ignore it and you will feel 
better”). Social exchange contexts may also have emotion norms that vary with the nature of the 
relationship. Business relationships—such as explicit contracting between representatives of 
different corporations—will likely have a norm of emotional neutrality; in fact, being 
“professional” in such contexts is being in control of one’s emotions. Bargainers suppress the 
urge to display their excitement in order not to “tip their hand” to the opposing party and raise 
suspicion. By the same token, anger or contempt for the other party is held in check. There is 
much surface acting in these exchanges.  
 The opposite also may occur. At times actors intentionally reveal a false emotion for 
strategic purposes. Professional gamblers feign nervousness, joy, or confidence to create 
impressions that give them an advantage. “Bluffing” is a strategic act and inherent feature of 
many economic exchange contexts. Ironically, in contexts where bluffing is normatively 
expected—such as the poker table or used-car lot— it may actually lose effectiveness. In 
contrast, in very close relations, it is partially the emotional displays that are themselves the 
objects of exchange. The true expression of emotion becomes a valuable commodity above and 
beyond any material goods.  
 The cultural-normative perspective implies that the generalizability of social exchange 
principles is limited or conditioned by the emotional environment, e.g., emotion norms, emotion 
management, etc. Most contemporary exchange theories assume (and most empirical tests 
BRINGING EMOTIONS 14 
   
   
 
explicitly create) a relatively sterile and dispassionate environment with a neutral emotional tone. 
This inhibits the development and expression of emotion, enhances surface acting, and fosters an 
overall emotional context that makes the formation and maintenance of strong relations 
problematic. One can imagine that the typical exchange context is similar in some respects to 
that described by Hochschild’s flight attendants. In any case, the management and regulation of 
emotion norms across various exchange contexts are important avenues for future research. 
Structural/Relational Approaches 
 The orienting idea of the structural-relational approach is that positional differences 
create differences in felt emotion, and these have important effects on exchange relations and 
networks. Structural-relational theories predict emotion from specific relational attributes, such 
as one’s position in a power or status hierarchy. By way of comparison, cultural normative 
theories focus on symbolic or emergent social definitions and norms in groups with common 
identities (gangs, flight attendants, etc). In general, structural-relational theories tend to have a 
more deterministic flavor, making causal predictions for which emotions emerge given a set of 
structural conditions; whereas cultural- normative approaches are more conceptual and 
interpretive.  
 Kemper’s (1978, 1987,1990c) theory of emotion falls squarely in the structural tradition, 
given its focus on two relational attributes: power and status. His basic assumption is that an 
increase in power or status will result in positive emotions, while a decrease in power or status 
will lead to negative emotions. More specifically, Kemper (1978, 1990c) predicts that an 
increase in relative power results in feelings of security, while a decrease in relative power leads 
to fear or anxiety. The term “relative” in the preceding sentence is important. The theory predicts 
an individual feels secure when her or his own power is directly increased over another, or when 
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their power is indirectly increased due to a reduction in the power of the opposing party. The 
theory focuses on emotions caused by power or status dynamics that actually transpire, but it also 
suggests that anticipatory emotions occur when one expects a change in power or status whether 
or not it actually occurs.  
 Turning to status, changes again stimulate emotional responses (Kemper 1990c). An 
increase in status produces satisfaction or happiness, while a decrease in status produces shame, 
anger, or depression. The case of status loss is more complex than that for status gain. Consider 
an x—y relationship in which person x suffers a loss in relative status. If x attributes the status 
loss to person y and believes it is not justified or legitimate, then the theory predicts x should be 
angry. But when x assumes responsibility for the status loss, then the emotion is likely to be 
shame. Finally, if an uncontrollable external agent is responsible for status loss, then depression 
is the predicted result.  
 Kemper offers a rigorous theory that connects power and status dynamics to emotional 
phenomena. He distinguishes the emotional consequences of power and status conditions, and 
recent research affirms that power and status dimensions produce somewhat different emotions 
or emotional processes. Let us consider some of this research by exchange theorists. 
Emotions Produced by Power.  In exchange theory, power is defined as a structural potential 
based in the pattern and quality of exchange opportunities (Emerson 1972b, 1981, Willer & 
Anderson 1981). The classical example of structural power is a three-actor dating network, A—
B—C, where the centrally located B has the option of dating two people each of whom has no 
dating alternatives. Assuming that interactions between one dyad preclude interactions in the 
other, then A or C must always be excluded on any given night of dating. By the same token, 
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position B will always be guaranteed to have a partner, and so we say that B occupies a high 
power position.  
 There is considerable evidence that actors who bargain from high power positions, like 
actor B in the three line shown above, tend to experience positive emotions. Willer and 
associates (1997) tested this proposition directly. They measured the emotions of all three actors 
after a series of bilateral negotiations in the three-actor line. The results show that B tended to 
report strong positive emotions following exchanges, while A and C reported negative emotional 
reactions. The finding that power differences yield corresponding emotional reactions has also 
been reported by Lawler & Yoon (1993, 1996).  
 Molm (1991) provides further evidence on the relationship between power and emotion. 
She reports an interesting asymmetry between the base of power (reward versus punishment) and 
satisfaction with the exchange relation. Data from a series of experiments indicate that a single 
unit of punishment decreases satisfaction more than a single unit of reward increases satisfaction. 
That is, punishment power has a stronger effect than reward power on emotional reactions. The 
finding that individuals respond more strongly to negative outcomes is consistent with research 
on collective action (Hardin 1991) and exchange networks (Skvoretz & Zhang 1997, Thye et al 
1997). In sum, the evidence reviewed above indicates that actors who occupy low power 
positions of various types experience negative emotions, while actors in high power positions 
experience positive emotions. 
Emotions Produced by Status. Those who study status processes in face- to-face discussion 
groups have arrived at similar conclusions. Bales (1950, 1953) argued that positive emotional 
behaviors, such as acting friendly or expressing agreement, are functional to the group because 
such behaviors promote positive task outcomes. Bales reasoned that in collective and task- 
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oriented groups, negative emotions emerge when individual group members disagree, and these 
have deleterious effects by diverting attention and time from the task. Positive socioemotional 
behaviors help members maintain a task focus and deal with disputes along the way (Bales & 
Slater 1955, Bales & Hare 1965). Shelly (1993) suggests further that positive sentiments can 
shape interaction and influence, as does status in expectation states theory. 
 Ridgeway & Johnson (1990) develop an expectation states theory of status and 
socioemotional behavior, explaining why high- and low-status persons experience different 
emotions. They argue that group members with positive status characteristics are targets of 
higher performance expectations, and as a result, they receive positive feedback from group 
interactions and encounter very few disagreements from lower status group members. In the 
event a high status member is challenged by a status subordinate, the former will typically 
attribute the disagreement externally (e.g., “You clearly do not know what you’re talking 
about!”). In comparison, lower performance expectations are associated with members who 
possess the low states of status characteristics; they receive more criticism for expressing their 
ideas and tend to attribute criticisms internally (e.g., “You’re right, that is a silly idea.”). The 
combined result of differential performance expectations, selective feedback, and attributional 
biases is that high status members experience positive emotion and are more free to display these 
feelings. By the same token, low status group members experience negative emotions and are 
more apt to conceal them from the group. 
 Lovaglia & Houser (1996) propose the notion of “status compatible emotions” to explain 
how emotions combine with status to produce influence in groups. They suggest that positive 
emotion is compatible with high status, while negative emotion is compatible with low status. 
They conducted a series of experiments, and the results indicated that for both high- and low-
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status subjects, positive emotional reactions tended to decrease resistance to social influence, 
while negative emotion tended to increase resistance to influence attempts. These findings 
suggest that high status group members experience positive emotions and, as a consequence, 
become more open to the task suggestions made by lower status others. At the same time low 
status members experience negative emotions and consequently become more steadfast in their 
conviction. This research details how emotional reactions combine with status characteristics to 
determine patterns of social influence in groups. 
Exchange Process and Emotions 
Sensory/Informational Approaches 
 These theories emphasize that emotions convey information within or between 
individuals. This can happen in multiple ways. First, individuals can sense their own emotional 
reactions and use this information to make inferences about themselves and the environment. A 
person who overreacts to a friend’s mild criticism may, ex post facto, infer their friendship is 
drifting apart. Second, the display or visibility of an emotion to others may inform those others 
of one’s own internal reactions or disposition. In this example, the friend who was the target of 
the emotional outburst may make the same inference. This section discusses theories that detail 
how emotions signal information to the self and others. We use Heise’s (1979) affect control 
theory2 to illustrate signaling to self and Frank’s (1988) theory of moral sentiments to illustrate 
signaling to the other. 
 In affect control theory, emotions signal the self. Briefly, the theory assumes that 
individuals carry with them a set of “fundamental” meanings regarding themselves, other 
persons, objects or behaviors (Smith-Lovin & Heise 1988). Fundamental meanings refer to the 
                                                          
2 The affect control theory home page is at http://www.indiana.edu/~socpsy/ACT/Index.html. 
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evaluation of a person, object or action out of context. For example, most individuals probably 
believe that doctors, birthday cakes, and volunteer work are somewhat positive. Meaning is 
thought to vary along three primary dimensions: good-bad (evaluation), powerful-powerless 
(potency), and lively-quiet (activity). The evidence suggests that people from varying cultures 
and social strata organize fundamental meanings along these dimensions (Heise 1966). Transient 
meanings occur when objects, behaviors, and situations are strung together in more complex 
scenarios (e.g., the doctor abused her child). As a single unit of analysis, transient meanings can 
also be measured. Affect control theory assumes that individuals seek consistency between 
fundamental meanings (i.e., that which they believe to be true), and transient meanings (i.e., that 
which they experience at a given moment). Emotional reactions reflect whether or not this 
consistency is maintained. 
 In affect control theory, emotion is the result of a cognitive appraisal. The theory asserts 
that individuals occupy identities that provide baselines from which transient impressions (or 
events) are interpreted. An emotional reaction occurs when one experiences an event and then 
assesses how well it fits her or his fundamental understanding of the people, identities, and 
actions involved. When the fit between one’s fundamental understanding and transient 
impressions is good, emotions felt are consistent with the identity. An example is a person with a 
positive self identity (e.g., community volunteer) who experiences a positive, confirming event 
(e.g., an award recognizing service). Here the fundamental meaning associated with the identity 
is consistent with the positive transient meaning, and the theory predicts that positive emotions 
will ensue. When a person holds a negative identity (e.g., criminal) and experiences a consistent 
confirming event (e.g., an indictment), then negative emotions will be the result. The overarching 
BRINGING EMOTIONS 20 
   
   
 
assumption is consistency; events that confirm identities result in emotions with the same 
valence. 
 Applied to exchange theory, affect control theory suggests that the emotions experienced 
in exchange are contingent on the actors’ identities. As noted earlier, certain identities—such as 
corporate representative, professional arbitrator, or merchandise buyer—involve contextual 
norms that demand control of one’s emotional displays. Other identities such as colleague, 
friend, or husband are more forgiving in this respect, in that they normatively allow or generate 
richer emotional experiences. One implication is that as the exchange context changes from 
purely instrumental to partially expressive, the salience of certain identities will shift, resulting in 
a wider range and greater depth of emotions. 
 It’s worth noting that emotions in affect control theory are both social and relational. 
Heise (1987) suggests that when another person is a salient part of the environment, our transient 
experiences can move in the direction of that person’s identity. For example, when talking with a 
powerful senator, a person may have transient impressions such as awe or gratitude. When these 
emotions are displayed for others to see, we essentially broadcast our private appraisals outward. 
Thus, while emotions signal the self in affect control theory, they also may be communicated to 
others. 
 Such communication of emotion is the focus of Frank’s (1988, 1993) theory of moral 
sentiments. Frank begins with a rational-choice model of human action that assumes behavior is 
driven by immediate self-interest. He notes that the unbridled pursuit of self-interest, however, 
results in an interesting paradox: Actors who are always attempting to maximize their local self-
interest blindly stumble into social dilemmas. The dilemma is that such actors can never reap the 
benefits of collaboration, even when it promises greater rewards in the long run. A purely self-
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interested actor would always steal if she or he could safely do so without cost or detection; in a 
population of egoists, marriages could never survive external temptations, business partners 
would cheat one another, etc. These are instances of what Frank calls “the problem of 
commitment.”  
 Frank (1988, 1993) argues that emotions help individuals resolve the problem of 
commitment by fostering prosocial tendencies that are reciprocated over time. He claims that 
emotional reactions such as love, sorrow, and sympathy are powerful incentives that curb self-
interest. A spouse who is considering an affair, for example, may refrain out of love or respect 
for her partner. Workers who receive cash payments may nevertheless report all income to the 
IRS out of fear, guilt, or a sense of national identity. In this way emotional/affective processes 
short-circuit and regulate the desire for immediate self gratification.  
 Notice that although emotions help promote long-term behavioral commitment for any 
given person, the unilateral experience of emotion is not enough to fully solve the commitment 
problem. Long-term committed relationships can only emerge when each party (a) experiences 
commitment-inducing emotions and (b) can detect (and be detected by) others with the same 
capacity. The first trait gives one the ability to control passing temptations; the second ensures 
that individuals with high “moral fiber” are likely to locate similar others. Frank suggests that 
individuals communicate their emotional makeup through subtle behavioral gestures and cues 
that have evolved through biological mechanisms.  
 To summarize, the theory of moral sentiments postulates that emotions allow 
commitment to emerge, but long-term committed relationships prosper only when emotional 
reactions are coordinated at the dyadic level. Frank provides a convincing argument for the 
importance of emotional expressions to the development of trust and commitment. The broad 
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implication for exchange theory is that communicated emotions are an inherent part of social 
interaction, and these are particularly important to the development of cohesive or solidary 
relations. 
Cognitive Approaches 
 A rather large body of psychological research examines how emotions influence 
cognition. Mood, affect, and feelings all have been shown to impact how people process 
information and the degree to which they reveal a concern for others. It is now well established 
that individuals in a positive mood perceive, encode, interpret, and remember events in a more 
positive light than do individuals in a negative mood (Bower 1981, 1991, Isen 1987). For 
example, Isen and colleagues (1978) have shown that subjects in a positive mood tend to have 
better recall for positive trait adjectives such as “kind” or “friendly” learned at an earlier point in 
time. Others find a tendency for individuals in a given mood state to have greater recall for 
material learned while in that same mood state, a phenomenon known as state-dependent 
learning (Bartlett et al 1982, Bower et al 1981). Overall there is little doubt that emotions (both 
positive and negative) affect how information is encoded and retrieved from memory. 
 Emotional states also have been shown to bias social judgments (Bower 1991). Wright & 
Bower (1992) found that, compared to subjects in a neutral mood, those in a good mood tended 
to overestimate the probability of positive events and underestimate the probability of negative 
events. Subjects in a bad mood did just the opposite—they overestimated the probability of 
negative events and saw positive events as less likely. Johnson & Tversky (1983) report 
comparable biases with respect to subjective frequencies. In a series of experiments, they found 
that subjects in a bad mood tended to overestimate the frequency of other bad events. Others 
found that positive emotions correlate with the tendency to make risky decisions, but only when 
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the potential for loss is small or inconsequential (Isen & Patrick 1983, Isen & Geva 1987). All of 
this research indicates that moods do in fact shape social judgments. 
 What is not so well understood is exactly why moods alter social judgments. We 
identified four distinct models of judgment in the psychological literature. According to the 
priming model advanced by Bower (1981, 1991), the common thread that weds these research 
findings together is that positive or negative emotional states activate and make salient cognitive 
structures of the same valence. A distinct, but related, model suggests that mood-congruent 
social judgments result from efforts to maintain one’s current mood state (Isen 1987, Wegener et 
al 1995). These ideas are particularly relevant to exchange theories, as they suggest that 
pleasant/unpleasant social exchanges trigger cognitions of the same tone that build on one 
another over time and ultimately bias information processing. This is one basis for “bounded 
rationality.” 
 A third model assumes that individuals make decisions, in part, by sensing their current 
emotional reactions and using this data as input (Schwarz & Clore 1983, Schwarz 1990, Clore & 
Parrott 1994). From this perspective, emotional reactions operate as stimuli that sometimes can 
be confused with more objective information. We have all made decisions that just don’t feel 
right, and when this happens, it is tempting to cast aside more reasoned thought and judgment. 
This raises an interesting possibility for exchange theory. If emotional states function as 
information, then it is at least possible that emotions originating from earlier exchanges with 
other people might carry-over into the current exchange context. The emotional consequence of a 
morning speeding ticket might still be felt in that afternoon’s business meeting. Research on 
sympathetic activation and excitation transfer provide conceptual and empirical support for this 
possibility (Zillman 1983). 
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 Perhaps the most provocative ideas for exchange theory come from the reduced capacity 
model, which holds that emotions disrupt attention or diminish cognitive capacity (Eysenck 
1977, Isen 1987, Mackie & Worth 1989, 1991). Considerable research documents that emotional 
experiences tend to result in superficial information processing. For example, Mackie & Worth 
(1989, 1991) report that subjects in a positive mood are less attentive to messages and have 
poorer recall of their content compared to subjects in a neutral mood. Presumably, emotional 
reactions consume cognitive resources that might be directed elsewhere. Mackie & Worth 
provide further evidence in support of this idea, reporting that subjects who feel positive simply 
take longer to read and interpret a message, which again suggests lowered cognitive ability. 
 Turning to negative emotion, studies show that high-fear subjects tend to rely more on 
group stereotypes and process messages less carefully (Wilder & Shapiro 1989, Baron, Inman, 
Kao & Logan 1992). For example, Wessel & Merckelbach (1997) found that spider phobics 
exposed to a large live spider (i.e., the high-fear group) had less recall for minor details than did 
non-spider phobics (i.e., the low-fear group). However, at least one recent experiment questions 
these ideas. Baron and colleagues (1994) report that high fear patients about to receive a dental 
filling actually process cavity-related information more carefully than patients in a low fear 
condition. They argue that lazy information processing may actually result from attentional shifts 
toward the stressor, rather than an overall diminution of cognitive ability. 
 Applied to exchange theory, lazy information processing may enhance the cohesion and 
solidarity of exchange relations and groups by promoting relaxed accounting. Individuals who 
adopt a relaxed or “loose” accounting system do not keep precise records of the benefits or costs 
to actors, whereas restrictive accounting systems are characterized by continuous and precise 
tallying of such information. Kollock (1993) used computer simulation to demonstrate that 
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relaxed accounting systems produce more mutual cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games. The 
immediate implication is that if positive emotions promote lazy information processing and 
relaxed accounting systems, this may in turn promote mutual cooperation, commitment, trust, 
and solidarity in those relations. Overall, there are good reasons to believe emotions bias how 
individuals perceive and interpret their exchanges with others. In the following section we 
illustrate one such bias with an application to elementary theory. 
An Application.  There is an interesting theoretical link between social cognition research and 
the elementary theory of power in social relations (Willer 1981, Willer & Markovsky 1993). 
Willer and associates put forth a resistance theory that suggests power is partially determined by 
what actors hope (or aspire) to receive in exchange with others. From cognitive theories we 
hypothesize that if individuals in exchange relations experience positive and negative emotions, 
these systematically bias what they hope to receive as they negotiate exchange. Resistance theory 
asserts that actors possess a certain level of “resistance” to exchange depending on their best 
expected payoff (Pmax) and the payoff at confrontation when no exchange occurs (Pcon). 
According to the theory, A’s resistance (RA) to a given offer (PA) is given by the following 
equation, 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴max− 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴con . 
 This suggests that actors resist exchange when they expect to receive more than they are 
offered (PMax− PA is large) or when the profit they are offered barely outweighs the profit from 
no exchange at all (PA − Pcon is small). The theory asserts that exchanges between A and B 
occur when the resistance of A is equal to the resistance of B such that 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴max − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴con = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵max − 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵con = 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵. 
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 To briefly illustrate, assume actors A and B must agree on how to divide 20 units of 
profit or each will earn nothing. Assuming each unit of profit is indivisible, each actor can 
reasonably hope to take no more than 19 of the possible 20 units. If either actor requests all 20 
units then the incentive to exchange dissipates. Thus we have 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴max = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵max =19. If A and B 
fail to reach agreement then they each earn nothing making 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴con = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵con = 0. It follows that 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = 19 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 − 0 = 19 − 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 0 = 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵. 
 Since any agreement between A and B must sum to 20 units, we set PB = (20− PA) and 
solve to find PA = 10 and therefore 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 = 10. In dyadic exchange where each party has no 
alternative, the resistance model predicts an equal division of the profit pool. 
 The relevant point for our purposes is that resistance to exchange entails the weighing of 
best hopes (Pmax) against worst fears (Pcon). Recall from our earlier discussion that actors in a 
positive mood tend to overestimate the probability of positive outcomes, while actors in a 
negative mood state tend to be less optimistic and view negative events as more likely (Wright & 
Bower 1992). When incorporated into resistance theory, this finding implies that emotions bias 
Pmax in the direction of one's emotional state during the negotiations. 
 Consider the following example. Again let actors A and B negotiate how to divide a 20-
point profit pool under the conditions specified above. Further, assume that A is in a positive 
mood while B is in a somewhat negative mood. For ease of calculation, let’s assume the 
emotions of A and B are reliably measured, then standardized on a scale (𝐸𝐸*) ranging from 0 to 
1 such that larger values reflect more positive emotion. Let 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴* = 1.0 and 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵* = .70. Use this 
bias to calculate PAmax = (1.0)19 = 19 and PBmax = .70(19) = 13.3. Plugging these new 
values into the resistance equation and solving for PA yields a slight profit advantage for A such 
that PA = 11.76 and PB = 8.23. This example demonstrates how emotional reactions, because 
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they act on the judgments of exchange-related information, might affect social exchange 
outcomes. 
 Thus, actors in a positive mood should perceive Pmax to be approximately its full value, 
or at least higher than the Pmax for those in a negative mood state. Similarly, actors in a relatively 
negative mood should have reduced profit aspirations and perceive their Pmax to be lower. The 
combined effect of these emotions is a slight profit advantage for actors with positive feelings 
and higher profit aspirations. This is, of course, a testable prediction. 
Exchange Outcomes and Emotions 
Attributional Approaches 
 Weiner (1985, 1986) puts forth an attribution theory of emotion that addresses how actors 
interpret the often vague and global feelings they experience in interaction or exchange with 
others. He argues that when an actor experiences a successful or blocked goal opportunity, the 
result is a generalized emotional reaction that is global and diffuse. Weiner terms these 
“primitive” emotions. They are dependent on the outcome of the interaction but not associated 
with anything in particular. Importantly, such emotions generate an attribution process through 
which actors attempt to understand and interpret the sources (causes) of the interaction outcomes. 
Thus, the global (i.e., primitive) emotions are “outcome dependent” and “attribution 
independent.” 
 In Weiner’s (1985) theory, positive emotions (pleasure, happiness) follow a positive 
event and negative emotions (sadness) follow a negative event, an idea quite compatible with 
exchange theorizing. He holds that the attribution process reshapes these emotional reactions, 
further differentiating the generalized emotions into more specific affective reactions. The sense 
of sadness following a spoiled job interview may be transformed into shame (if attributed to self) 
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or anger (if attributed to the other). These specific emotions are “attribution dependent” because 
they result directly from the causal attributions associated with the event. Through this 
attribution process, more specific emotions evolve and become attached to particular objects 
(i.e., self, other, situation). 
 The object targeted by the attribution process actually determines the specific emotion 
that emerges. As noted, guilt or shame result from negative outcomes attributed to one’s self, and 
anger results from negative events attributed to arbitrary or illegitimate acts of others. Pride 
results from attributions of positive events to self, and gratitude results from attributions of 
positive events to the other. Weiner’s theory posits a series of feedback loops through which 
attribution-specific emotions are formed and guide an individual’s future behavior. As with other 
attribution theories, however, the emphasis is on attributions to individuals based on their 
behavior. In social exchange such individualized attributions are more difficult because exchange 
outcomes are joint products of two or more actors’ behaviors. 
 Weiner’s approach nevertheless represents an important contribution to the study of 
emotion. He recognizes that some emotions result from events that require very little cognitive 
processing, while others emerge after more careful thought or reflection. In this sense, he finds a 
viable middle ground in the classic debate regarding the primacy of affect versus cognition 
(Lazarus 1984, Zajonc 1984). By differentiating global from specific emotions and elucidating 
the specific types of attributions that lead from one to another, his theory suggests a dynamic 
picture of the way emotions unfold in exchange relations. 
 To develop an explicit link to exchange theory, two shifts are needed in Weiner’s 
framework. First, the primitive, global emotions should be viewed as internal 
reinforcements/punishments that people consciously feel and attempt to explain or understand. 
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Involuntary, global emotional reactions then are motivating states in exchange relations because, 
once they are part of conscious awareness, actors strive to reproduce positive feelings and avoid 
negative feelings. This theoretical shift narrows the emotions of concern to those that are global 
and detected (perceived) by the actors themselves. For exchange theorizing, it seems quite 
reasonable to suppose that people involved in exchange relations sometimes feel good or bad as 
a result of the exchange; they are motivated to reproduce the positive and eliminate the negative 
emotions; and therefore they try to understand and interpret their own emotional reactions. 
 The second shift needed is that the objects of attributions should include “social units” in 
addition to self, other, and situation. This is implied by the jointness and “social embeddedness” 
of exchange. If social units—such as exchange relations, networks, groups, or larger 
organizations and communi- ties—become targets or perceived causes of global feelings, then 
emotion attributions have important implications for solidarity-related phenomena such as 
compliance (Hechter 1987), solidarity (Markovsky & Lawler 1994), affective attachments 
(Kanter 1968, Lawler 1992), and relational cohesion (Lawler and Yoon 1996). Social units 
perceived as the cause of positive feelings in exchange should generate stronger individual-to-
collective attachments than those perceived as a source of negative feelings from exchange. The 
social-formations perspective examined next elaborates these implications. 
Social-Formation Approaches 
 Two basic ideas are the foundation of the social-formations approach. The first is directly 
from social exchange theory: that mutual dependencies are the underlying structural conditions 
for cohesion and solidarity in social units (Emerson 1972a,b, Hechter 1987, Molm & Cook 1995, 
Lawler & Yoon 1996). Mutual dependence is the degree to which two or more actors in a 
relation, network, or group are dependent on each other for valued rewards. Emerson (1972b) 
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explicitly indicated that cohesion was a function of the sum or average of each actor’s 
dependence on the other.3 
 The second idea originates in Durkheim (1915) and has been developed more recently by 
Collins (1975, 1981, 1989, 1993). This is that joint activities generate uplift, elation, confidence, 
or other emotions that affirm and make salient social ties and group memberships. This is the 
centerpiece of Collins’ (1981, 1989) theory of interaction ritual chains. Theories in the social-
formations tradition explain how the emotions and feelings that social exchange generates, in 
turn, foster cohesion or solidarity. 
 How can we theorize the degree and consequence of jointness in social exchange 
contexts? Kelley & Thibaut (1978) distinguished three types of dependencies: reflexive control, 
fate control, and behavioral control. These refer respectively to the degree that actors’ outcomes 
are determined by their own behavior (independence), the behavior of the other (dependence), or 
a combination of their own and others’ behavior (interdependence). Mutual fate control 
establishes the foundation for trading resources or behaviors that do not produce new value to be 
divided but still involve contingencies. In contrast, mutual behavioral control promotes the 
negotiation of coordinated behaviors that have multiplicative effects on resources or exchange 
outcomes (Molm 1994). These forms of dependence are interwoven, and it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that the greater the degree of mutual behavioral control (interdependence) and the 
lower the degree of mutual reflexive control (independence), the more actors take account of 
each other and the more they see the results of their exchange—positive or negative—as 
produced jointly. 
                                                          
3 The same point is also built into Molm’s (1987) idea of “average power” and Bacharach & Lawler’s (1981) notion 
of “total power.” 
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 In discussing Weiner’s (1985, 1986) theory, we already proposed that interdependence 
makes the relevant social units (dyads, groups, organizations, etc) causal objects in actors’ 
attributions. How and when might such attributions occur? Lawler & Yoon (1993, 1995, 1996, 
1998) addressed this question in their theory of relational cohesion. They argued that structural 
conditions of dependence—relative and total (mutual) dependencies—make exchanges between 
some pairs of actors more likely than others. Specifically, when mutual dependence is high, then 
actors should find one another more attractive relative to other potential exchange partners. 
When relative dependence is equal as opposed to unequal, then they should find it easier to reach 
agreement because neither has an a priori bargaining advantage that raises fairness issues. The 
theory indicates that exchange frequencies across pairs of actors in a network or group will vary 
depending on these conditions of dependence (Lawler & Yoon 1996). 
 The theory of relational cohesion goes on to argue that structural dependence relations do 
not have a direct impact on the formation of cohesive exchange relations; the effects are indirect 
and mediated by exchange frequencies and the emotions produced. Successful exchange 
generates global feelings of pleasure/satisfaction and interest/excitement, emotions that are 
“primitive” in Weiner’s terms. Actors are motivated to interpret and understand the causes of 
these feelings, and in the process, their exchange relations become more salient. In this way, 
globalized positive emotions lead actors to view the exchange relation or group as a cohesive 
object, and they then are willing to take risks or make sacrifices on its behalf. Several studies by 
Lawler & Yoon (1993, 1995, 1996, 1998) demonstrate that the endogenous process—from 
exchange frequency, to positive emotions, to perceived cohesion—produces commitment to 
exchange relations. Through this process, the exchange relation becomes an expressive object of 
attachment for actors. 
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 The emotional aspects of social formation processes can be elaborated by Collins’ theory 
of interaction ritual chains. Interaction ritual is infused with emotion and expressiveness. Collins 
argues that interactions require and produce emotional energy, a global, undirected reserve of 
positive feelings (e.g., confidence, uplift). Emotional energy is a “common denominator” across 
situations and relations, and it is fundamentally what binds group members together. Emotions 
are synchronized, microlevel events that spread across interactions and have macrolevel effects 
on the group structure and stability. 
 To Collins (1981, 1989, 1993), an interaction ritual entails (a) at least two people, who 
(b) have a mutual focus on some object or action. A church prayer, faculty meeting, or long-
distance telephone conversation are potential contexts for interaction ritual. The conditions for 
enhanced social solidarity include not only a mutual focus but also (c) the experience of a 
common mood or emotion and, by implication, the sharing of that emotion, as well as (d) the 
strengthening of feelings over time. All of these conditions, with the possible exception of the 
last, seem to fit the conditions usually found in social ex- change—a mutual focus and common 
mood. When these conditions are satisfied, Collins (1989:18) asserts that a social boundary 
begins to emerge within which “participants feel like members of a little group, with moral 
obligations to one another.” In this way, socially based emotions set the stage for or reaffirm 
symbolic group membership and social solidarity. Collins’ theory specifies an emotional 
foundation for group formation in contrast to the predominantly cognitive one found in social 
identity theorizing (Kramer & Brewer 1984, Kramer 1991). There are strong affinities between 
Collins’ work and recent theory and research on emotion in social exchange. 
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 To conclude, the core ideas of the social-formations approach to emotion in exchange can 
be stated as follows: Mutual dependencies (or interdependencies) produce joint activities which, 
in turn, generate positive/negative emotions or feelings; to the extent that these emotions are 
attributed to the relevant social unit, they produce stronger/weaker individual-collective ties, 
and those groups memberships command more/less cooperation and compliance. When 
emotions produce stronger individual-collective ties, relational or group memberships appear 
more distinctive than before and stand out more vis-a-vis alternative memberships. Feedback 
effects also occur such that mutual dependencies are enhanced by the consequences they 
produce. The growth and decline of exchange-based relations and groups might be understood in 
these terms. 
Conclusion 
 The sociology of emotions and the sociology of exchange are highly distinct, 
incommensurable traditions with very different assumptions about actors and human behavior 
(e.g., Emerson 1972a, Kemper 1990a, Collins 1981, Scheff 1990b, Hochschild 1983, Molm & 
Cook 1995). The actors of exchange theories are individualistic, instrumental, and emotionally 
vacuous, whereas those of emotion theories are socially oriented, expressive, and emotionally 
deep and complex. The former are driven by reason, the latter by passion. Yet research from a 
variety of domains shows that passion and reason are intertwined, and this poses an important 
question: What role do emotions play in social exchange? 
 We illustrate the potential fruitfulness of building emotion and emotional processes into 
exchange theorizing by surveying a range of sociological and psychological work on emotions. 
Emotion theories raise many questions of relevance to social exchange (e.g., Hochschild 1983, 
Heise 1987, Frank 1988); they suggest new testable propositions that refine existing exchange 
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predictions (e.g., Bower 1991), expand the range of phenomena treated by exchange theorizing 
(e.g., Lovaglia & Houser 1996, Lawler & Yoon 1996) and point toward a richer exchange-theory 
explanation for social cohesion and solidarity than is possible with extant cognitive or rational-
choice principles (see Hechter 1987). Our coverage has been necessarily selective, yet we have 
identified six traditions in the emotions literature that contain implicit or explicit claims about 
emotional aspects of social exchange—its context, process, or outcomes. 
 Together, the six approaches reveal a multitude of theoretical junctures at which 
emotional phenomena can complement, deepen, or broaden exchange theorizing and research. A 
cultural-normative perspective (e.g., Hochschild 1979, 1983) sensitizes us to the fact that 
exchange contexts necessarily entail emotion norms that limit the public expression of emotions, 
and result in actors managing their emotions to fit their roles or positions. Structural-relational 
approaches posit different emotions for actors with high power-status versus actors with low 
power-status, and analyze when these emotions maintain or undermine interpersonal relations 
(e.g., Ridgeway & Johnson 1990, Lovaglia & Houser 1996). Sensory-information approaches 
cast emotions as signals within the exchange process, revealing the intentions and 
trustworthiness of exchange partners (e.g., Frank 1988), or indicating whether an actor’s felt 
emotions are consistent with his or her identity in that context (e.g., Heise 1987). Cognitive 
theory and research indicate that positive (or negative) emotions enhance, correspondingly, an 
actor’s perceived probability of positive (or negative) behaviors by an exchange partner. 
Attribution theory helps us understand why and how actors explain and interpret global feelings 
generated by exchange outcomes (e.g., Weiner 1986). The social-formations approach elucidates 
the conditions under which these global feelings strengthen or weaken the cohesion of exchange 
relations or person-to-group ties (e.g., Collins 1981, Lawler & Yoon 1996). 
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 The six approaches also imply distinct emotional underpinnings for different forms of 
social exchange (see Emerson 1972b, Ekeh 1974, Molm & Cook 1995 for a classification of 
forms of exchange). Of particular relevance is the contrast between negotiated and reciprocal 
exchange—respectively, a context where actors repeatedly negotiate the terms of a trade versus a 
context involving the sequential provision of unilateral benefits (e.g., favors, gifts, etc) with 
unspecified timing and obligations (Blau 1964, Emerson 1981, Molm & Cook 1995). 
Negotiated-exchange contexts usually promote and reward dispassionate, unemotional images or 
presentations of self in the actual process of negotiating, i.e., a “professional demeanor” or 
“affective neutrality” in Parsons’ (1951) terms. Reciprocal exchange allows a wider array of 
emotional expressions and a greater variety of emotion norms to emerge. 
 We hypothesize that the cohesion and solidarity of relations based on reciprocal exchange 
should be quite sensitive to emotional expressions in the exchange process. For example, 
experiencing and expressing gratitude, in response to a favor, help assure the giver that the 
recipient will likely reciprocate sometime in the future; expressing anger in response to a denial 
of a favor is an implied threat not to provide benefits in the future; expressing sadness may 
invoke shame or guilt in the other and engender backtracking or restitutive behavior. In 
reciprocal exchange, emotions expressed are also behaviors exchanged, and these affective 
exchanges should have important effects on trust and commitment; these are critical because the 
sequential character of reciprocal exchange entails more or different types of risk than the 
binding agreements of negotiated exchange (Molm 1994). Thus, emotion expressions are integral 
parts of the exchange process in reciprocal (nonnegotiated) social exchange. 
 In negotiated exchange, emotion expressions that reveal intentions may give the partner 
information to use as leverage, so the risk is revealing too much, not too little. The emotional 
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consequences of the joint outcomes (i.e. frequency of and profit from agreements made) should 
be more important than emotional expressions in the exchange process. First, jointness is more 
salient and the sense of common activity therefore stronger. Second, actors in negotiated 
exchange are more likely to perceive a shared responsibility for the outcomes and target the 
relation, network, or group. The upshot is that (ceterus paribus) the cohesion effects of successful 
exchange (i.e. outcomes) should be stronger for negotiated exchange than reciprocal exchange, 
whereas the cohesion effects for emotional expressions in the exchange process (i.e. displays) 
should be stronger for reciprocal exchange than for negotiated exchange. 
 In conclusion, we propose, based on our analysis here, that exchange relations, groups, 
and networks are more likely to endure if emotions (a) felt and expressed correspond with 
contextual norms and actors’ identities, (b) are openly shared so as to promote mutual trust, and 
(c) are attributed to the relevant social units. Relations and groups that regularly satisfy these 
criteria should yield greater compliance, obligation, sacrifice, and collective action than can be 
explained by extant social exchange theorizing (e.g. Ekeh 1974, Hechter 1987). In this sense, 
bringing emotion into exchange theory has the potential to generalize and deepen social 
exchange explanations of social order and solidarity. We believe general questions about social 
exchange and social order are important avenues for future theorizing and research because 
exchange serves as a bridging phenomenon forging ties across differentiated parts of social 
systems (Ekeh 1974). Emotions and emotional processes warrant a central role in such 
theorizing. 
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Figure 1. Where emotions enter the exchange process. 
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Figure Captions 
Fig. 1. Where emotions enter the exchange process. 
